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DEVELOPMENT BY THE
MEDIEVAL CANONISTS OF
THE CONCEPT OF EQUITY
WILLIAM F. CAHILL*
V ERY MANY CLERGYMEN sat as judges of the King's Court from the
time Henry II established it as a judicial body distinct from the
Council, until the clergy, in belated obedience to papal commands, with-
drew from the bench during the reign of Richard 11.1 Their departure
from the Court marked the end of "the creative age of our medieval law."
2
From the reign of Henry III until that of Henry VIII, nearly all the
Chancellors and most of their Masters were priests or bishops.3 In this
period, the Chancery was transformed from an executive bureau to a
judicial organ complementing the law courts.
The philosophy of law which these men learned in their clerical studies,
and the canonical system in which they had their first experiences as
lawyers, must have influenced their conduct as judges in the King's Court.
The influence must have had greater effect in the Chancery, where it
was not so strongly opposed by the pressures of class and national
customs, sheriff's routine, the magnate's resentments and the legisla-
ture's jealousies.
Further, the ecclesiastic acting as Chancellor was operating in his own
line of country. The canonical judge, the bishop of a diocese, or the
delegate of the diocesan bishop or of the Pope, enjoyed powers and felt
concerns which were broader than those of a judge whose chief business
was to resolve controversy between contenders. He was charged to look
after the welfare of the community and the salvation of the souls of
individual men. Sin, the conscious breach of the rules of virtue, was to
him the greatest of evils, and so he had to give much attention to the
intent, the good faith or bad faith, with which men acted.
B.A., LL.B., J.C.D.; Priest of the Diocese of Albany.
1 SPENCE, THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 107, 113-15;
and see Decretalium Gregorii IX, c. 3, X, "Ne clerici vel monachi secularibus
negotiis se immisceant," II, 50.
2 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 133 (2d ed. 1899).
3 SPENCE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 347.
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Yet he had to maintain the good order
of the external community of Christians,
so that he must limit the immunities of
good faith when it trespassed upon good
order. He had some share in the legislative
Rev. William F. Cahill
power of the Church, but it was more sig-
nificant that he had power to dispense indi-
viduals from their duty to observe many of
the Church's laws. He had executive power
to act on his own motion and to compel
obedience by penalties. He was not only
permitted, but even urged, to avoid formali-
ties in procedure.
It seems to me that no other single aspect
of the medieval ecclesiastic's character had
so much effect upon his thought and con-
duct in the Chancery as did his philosophy
of equity. His notion of what equity is,
and of how it ought to be used in administer-
ing the law, was, I think, most fundamental
in his development of the Chancery juris-
prudence. All of the rest of the lore and
practice he learned in the Church and
brought to the Chancery was ancillary to
this philosophy.
To trace, even briefly, the churchman's
concept of equity, we shall have to begin
with Hildebrand's reform of Church disci-
pline after he became Pope Gregory VII
in 1073, and go forward to Thomas
Aquinas' teaching and writing, between
1254 and 1274. In this period, which runs
roughly from the time of the Conquest to
the early years of Edward I, a philosophy
of equity and law was developed by the
canonists and formulated definitively by
St. Thomas.
Gregory himself, almost immediately
after he began his reform of the Church,
perceived that the decrees of reform might
have the effect of stopping, in most of
Europe, the chief works of the Church. If
the decrees had been enforced strictly,
which excluded from exercise of the
ministry priests whose ordinations or whose
ordaining prelates were tainted with simony,
or whose appointments to ecclesiastical
office had been made by lay lords, or whose
lives were stained by concubinage, few
parish priests would have retained authori-
zation to preach the Gospel or to administer
the Sacraments. Men would lack teachers
of God's truth and ministers of His grace.
An untainted cleric could "scarcely be
found," for those which the decrees would
exclude from exercise of the ministry were
innumerable.4
The decrees were not always rigorously
applied. Penitent and reformed concu-
binaries were absolved, men validly but
unlawfully ordained, and men who had
received lay investiture were left in charge
of parishes, and the bishops forbore to
censure laymen who received the Sacra-
ments, in good faith or out of necessity,
from the hands of priests censured by the
4 See BRYs, DE DISPENSATIONE IN 1URE CANONICO
63 (Bruges, 1925).
decrees. Gregory's successor, Urban II,
wrote, "Ecclesiastical authorities judge
many things strictly according to the tenor
of the canons; they patiently tolerate many
things because of the need of the times,
and they exercise restraint by passing over
many things on account of people's charac-
ters." ' 5 Precedent for the policy of applying
the law less than strictly was found in the
writings of the Fathers of the Church who
had urged indulgence toward those who
wished to return to the Church after having
lapsed into heresy or apostacy.6
Two men who had been Urban's friends
before his elevation to the Papacy were
among the canonists whose writings, at
the beginning of the twelfth century, were
influential in implementing the reform
commenced by Hildebrand. They were
lawyers and gave reasoned form to the
policy of moderating the law in its applica-
tion. In their doctrine, equity is equated
with mercy. If the reason for the Church's
existence is to save men's souls, the admin-
istrators of Church law must not, in their
concern for the welfare of the Church as
a body, lose sight of the need to save the
weak and the necessitous. Bernaldus of
Constance, writing just before 1100, found
the weakness of men a good cause for
softening the harshness of the canons. He
urged attention to the bad effects of strictly
enforcing discipline when delinquents were
very numerous, and he pointed to the
common canonical practice of lessening
penalties when a delinquent confessed
p. JAFFE, REGESTA PONTIFICIUM ROMANORUM
n. 5383 (2d ed. Berlin, 1888).
6 See Cyprianus, Epistola ad Antoniarum, 3
MIGNE, PATROLOGIA LATINA 780 [hereinafter cited
as M.L.]; Augustine, Commentary on the Epistle
to the Galatians, ch. 2, v. 5, 20 M.L. 359.
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spontaneously. 7 Ives, Bishop of Chartres
from 1091 to 1116, advised that rigor
and mercy be balanced according to need,
so that the strong be not enervated by
indulgence, nor the weak broken by
severity.8
In the time of Bernaldus and Ives, the
systematic study of Roman Law was under-
taken in the school of Bologna. Irnerius
and the other founders of that school were
not sterile or timeless antiquarians. They,
and their students, had had their formative
education in the liberal arts and in theology,
as did all of their contemporaries. Thus
they brought-to their study of Roman Law
the humanizing and rationalizing attitudes
of the theological schools of their time. Be-
cause they were acutely aware that the
civilization in which they lived needed a
common system of law, they studied Ro-
man Law for the purpose of filling that
need.9 Their theological background shows
itself in their effort to organize their studies
upon an all-inclusive and logically consecu-
tive scheme. In constructing that scheme,
they developed a concept of equity that was
broader and yet more precise than the
equity-mercy concept of the Gregorian
reformers.
Irnerius puts such a scheme at the head
of his treatise. He announces that he will
first discuss the business of equity and
justice, treating those virtues in two aspects:
equity and justice not enacted into law
and, then, equity and justice violated after
being so enacted. Next he will speak of
the law itself, and finally of those things,
7 Bernaldus, De Vitanda, 148 M.L. 1180, 1185-
86, 1186s.
8 Epistola 214, 162 M.L. 217.
9 Fornier, Un Tourant de rHistoire dtu Droit 1060-
1140, 41 NOUVELLE REVUE HISTORIQUE DE DROIT
FRANCAIS ET ETRANGER 129, 130 (1917).
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like custom, which are taken for law.10
Equity not yet enacted is natural law. The
law itself is equity reduced to writing. He
notes that the law is sometimes inequitable
and even unjust. In such case, he says,
the law has no force and must be immedi-
ately abrogated by the lawmaker. He is
emphatic that the equitable reform of the
law is the exclusive function of the law-
maker. "The interpretation that reconciles
these differences (between equity and law),
making equity into law, is reserved to
the princes only."" Though Irnerius' reser-
vation to the princes of power to revise
and even to interpret the law in accordance
with equity seems to have been stated
absolutely, he may not have intended it
so, for he does not discuss the problem
of how, if at all, equity enters into the act
of judging a case under the law.
Two of Irnerius' immediate successors
as teachers at Bologna took opposite views
on this question. Bulgarus excluded equity
from the act of judging, but Martin Gosia
took the line that equity should enter into
judgment as an expression or application
of the purposefulness of the law. 1 2 Vacarius,
who also had been a disciple of Irnerius,
taught Roman Law in England in 1139,
having been invited by Thomas A Becket,
Henry II's Chancellor.' 3 His statement on
the general relation of law and equity is
quite broad. "We say that even rude equity,
where it is clear, is to be preferred to law."
10 See KANTOROWICZ, STUDIES IN THE GLOSSATORS
OF THE ROMAN LAW 234 (1938).
11 See quotations of Irnerius in VINODOGRAFF,
DIRITTO ROMANO NELL'EUROPA MEDIOVALE 111
(2d ed. Riccobono Italian transl., Milan, 1950).
12 See KANTOROWICZ, op. cit. supra note 10, at
100.
1 Holland, The Activity of Magister Vacarius in
England, 2 COLLECTANEA OF OXFORD HISTORICAL
SOCIETY 139.
But in discussing a particular case, he
seems to lean to the side of Bulgarus and
the formalists. "The interpretation of the
judge, though it resolves the case between
the parties, should not attempt to reconcile
equity and law for fear of prejudicing the
cases of others."' 1 4
Irnerius' formulation of a general scheme
relating law and equity had an effect
almost immediately upon the canonists'
writings. Gratian completed his Decretum
in the early forties of the twelfth century.' 5
He accepts the general division of law
and equity proposed by Irnerius, though
he does not follow precisely its termi-
nology. 16 In treating the question of
whether the supreme lawmaker of the
Church could make an effective law in
disregard of equity, he clearly follows a
principle we have heard announced by
Irnerius. The Pope cannot give a privilege
which would make one person rich by
reducing others to misery.'7 On the place
of equity in judgment, he is with the
Gosiani, as the followers of Martin came
to be known. Gratian says, "a sentence
contrary to equity has the same force as
a law which would oblige the subjects to
do evil, for obedience is not due to prelates
in matters that are illicit.'s
Yet when Gratian addressed himself
directly to the problem of a judge using
equity to correct the law, his thought seems
to have paralleled that of Vacarius. "These
things are to be considered when the law
is made, for once the law has been enacted,
14 SELDEN SOCIETY, VACARIus, LIBER PAUPERUM
16 (De Zulveta ed. 1929).
15 STICKLER, 1 HISTORIA IURIS CANONICI 204
(Turin, 1950).
16 GRATIAN, DECRETUM, Dist. I, 1-3.
17 Cau. 25, 1, dictum p. c. 16.
18 Cau. 11, 3, dictum p. c. 90.
it is not permissible to judge concerning
them, but judgment must be made accord-
ing to the law."' 9 In another place he
says clearly that a sentence contrary to
the written law has no force,2 0 though he
of course saves the case where the law
gives discretion to the judge.2.
The influence of the "equity-mercy" con-
cept, which had been elaborated by
Bernaldus and Ives, is seen throughout the
Decretum. Gratian, however, explicitly
refers the concept to Isidore of Seville,
a Bishop in the seventh century, to whom
was attributed one of the most extensive
of the early collections of Church laws.
Isidore had said that one applying the
canons must construe them with an eye
to person, place, time and other circum-
stances of the case at hand.2 2 Gratian was
not content to recite general doctrines on
the relation of equity to the law. He
employed the equity concept as a tool to
accomplish the tasks he had set for himself:
to compile the decrees systematically,
according to their subject matter, and to
reconcile decrees whose sense, seemed dis-
cordant, so that those who used his
compilation might be able to choose and
understand the canonical provision which
should be applied in a given case. Compila-
tions made before the Decretum were
arranged on scarcely any other basis than
simple chronology, and offered little, if any,
help to a counsellor or a judge who had
to fit the law to a case.
Gratian's Decretum soon became the
basic work of all canonical teaching and
writing. As the lecturers in theology cast
their teaching into the form of comments
19 Dist. 4, dictum p. c. 2.
20 Cau. 2, 6, dictum p. c. 41.
21 Cau. 2, 5, dictum p. c. 18.
22 Dist. 29, Proem.; id., c. 1.
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upon the Sentences of Peter Lombard, the
teachers of canon law commented upon
the Decretum. And nearly all canonical
writing was a record of such comments,
called glosses. The glossators or com-
mentators of Gratian's Decretum were
called "decretists."
Some of the men who distinguished
themselves as lecturers on the Decretum
in the canon law schools of the Continent
reached influential positions in England.
In the last quarter of the twelfth century,
Gilbert de Glanville and Gerard Pucelle,
who had been teachers at Paris, held
respectively the Sees of Rochester and
Coventry.23 Some of the glosses on Gratian
in the Durha*m Cathedral Manuscript are
attributed to Gerard.2 4 That canonical
literature was current among the English
clergy of this period is illustrated by an
entry on the Lincoln Cathedral Register.
Peter of Paxton, a country parson, had a
complete set of canon law treatises down
to, and including, the Fourth Lateran
Council, which was held in 1215.25 A
good number of Englishmen earned repute
as teachers of the Decretum in the Conti-
nental schools. Two of the the most famous
were Richard de Lacy and one Alan who
was called "'Anglais."
Even yet it is not an easy task to search
out the learning of the decretists. When
the Decretum came to be printed, the
editors included only the glosses found
in manuscripts easily available to them,
so that the writings of most of the decretists
23 Kuttner & Rathbone, Anglo-Norman Canonists
of the Twelfth Century, 7 TRADIT1o 277, 289, 300.
24 Lefebvre, Gerard Pucelle, 5 DICTIONNAIRE DU
DROIT CANNONIQUE Col. 955 (Paris, 1935).
25 LINCOLN RECORD SOCIETY, 3 REGISTRUM ANTI-
QUISSIMUM OF THE CATHEDRAL CHURCH OF LIN-
COLN 164 (Foster & Major ed. 1931-40).
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can now be studied only in manu-
scripts widely scattered throughout Europe.
Indeed, it is only in the past twenty years
that any adequate effort has been made
to catalogue these manuscripts and that
effort, pushed by the initiative of one man,
Professor Kuttner of the Canon Law School
at Washington, has gone forward slowly.
A considerable number of these manu-
scripts represent the work of Anglo-
Norman canonists. Here we find continued
the thought of Irnerius and Gratian on the
contrasted concepts of "rude equity" and
"equity reduced to writing." In describing
how custom can come to have the force
of law, this caveat is made: "The usage
of custom cannot so far prevail that it
overcomes reason, that is, rude equity." '2
Another Anglo-Norman warns that the
broad statement, "Equity is the law's law,"
is true only of equity reduced to writing,
for rude equity only softens the rigor of
the law. 27 Some writers of this school took
a rather narrow view of the usefulness of
the "equity-mercy" concept. Commenting
upon the text of Gratian which says that
a just judge carries in one hand justice
and in the other mercy, the gloss declares,
"This is to be referred to different cases.
For one cannot exercise in the same deci-
sion both rigor and mercy."'28
The canonical executives, the same
bishops and delegates who sat as judges
when occasion demanded, exercised a
broad power of dispensation, relaxing an
26 Rhetorica Ecclesiatica, (Wahrmund ed.) QUEL-
LEN ZUR GESCHICHTE DES ROMANISCH-KANONI-
SCHEN PROCESSES IN MITTENALTER, I, iv, 35.
27 DECRETUM GRATIANI CUM GLOSSA ANONYMA,
Durham Cathedral Ms. C. II, fol. 49 - comment
upon Dist. 50, 25, v. indulgencie.
28 DECRETUM GRATIANI CUM GLOSSA ANONYMA,
Caius College, Cambridge, Cod. Ms. 676, fol. 28
- comment upon Dist. 45, 10.
individual's canonical duties because of
hardship or because the relaxation would
serve, better than the performance of
the duty, the individual's spiritual welfare
or the general good of the Church. The
common canonical doctrine was that such
relaxation of law did not change the law
and could not, therefore, establish rules
to be followed by persons who found them-
selves in circumstances similar to those in
which a dispensation had been granted
in the past, or by judges deciding other
cases. Yet one of the Anglo-Norman
decretists took the view that these grants
of favor did establish such rules.
When by dispensation the Canons settle
a matter contrary to the rule of the common
law, they do not always state whether or not
this is to be taken as an example for other
cases. I believe that the dispensation be-
comes common law [sometimes]. . . . The
matter is otherwise, however, where there is
added [in the dispensing canon] a clause
forbidding that the like be done in the fu-
ture ... ; yet, I would also consider whether
the cause for which the dispensation was
given be perpetual or temporary only.... 29
As time passed after Gratian had made
his compilation, new canonical decrees
issued from Rome, and it was necessary
for one who wished to know the law of
the Church to add knowledge of these new
"decretal letters" to the basic learning he
had gained from the Decretum and its
glossators. Professor Kuttner finds that of
the twenty-seven reported primitive collec-
tions of the decretals, fifteen are of
English origin.30
In September of 1234, St. Raymond
29 SUMMIA, Et est sciendum, GLOSSAE STUTTGAR-
DIENSES, Cod. Ms. Rouen Bibl. Municip. 710 (E.
29), fol. 136- comment upon Cau. 1, 7, 20.
30 Kuttner, Projected Corpus of Twelfth Century
Decretal Letters, 6 TRADrrIo 345, 351 (1949).
of Penafort completed the compilation of
such decretal -letters which Pope Gregory
IX had ordered four years before. Gregory
had this work published as an official
compilation, thus enacting, for the first
time, a systematic, self-consistent, and
fairly complete body of currently effective
canon law. This work must have gotten
an early notice in England. Henry of Susa
who, under the title of Cardinal Hostiensis,
was to achieve fame as a commentator
on the new collection of Decretals, was at
the court of Henry III from 1236 to 1244.
He came in the train of Queen Eleanor
but later assisted the King himself in
some canonical business. He must have
talked canonical shop with the people in
Henry's Chancery.
The Decretals of Gregory IX contain
no general disquisition on law and equity,
but the men who lectured on them and
made written commentaries incorporated
the established doctrines of the Decretum
and the decretists, and the kArked back
also to the glossators of the Roman Law.
Hostiensis indicates that the quarrel begun
among the Romanists of Bologna had
continued and had spread to involve the
canonists. He opposes Martin Gosia to
John Bassiani who, at the end of the twelfth
century, had developed the teaching of
Bulgarus, Martin's direct opponent.- Hos-
iiensis says:
For Martin was a spiritual man and, as far
as he could in his time, always held to the
divine law against the rigor of the civil law.
But John did not savor the things of the
spirit, and like an animal gave nearly all of
his attention to temporal things and the rigor
of the civil law. Wherefore he and his fol-
lowers, of whom there are many in this day,
reject spiritual opinions and say, "This is the
captious equity of Martin". But whether they
7 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1961
like it or lump it, the law must follow
this equity wherever danger to souls is in
question. . .. If the pagan gave effect to the
natural equity of the law of reason, what
should a Christian do with the equity of the
natural law that is contained in the Law [of
Moses] and the Gospel?31
One of the distinctive contributions that
St. Thomas Aquinas made to the teaching
of morals was his adoption and adaptation
of Aristotle's treatment of the virtues. In
the Philosopher's work 32 he found that
two distinct virtues are said to govern the
act of judgment. There is synesis, which
helps one to judge rightly according to the
principles which are called "the common
rules" because they are quite closely related
to the matter in hand. And there is gnome,
which helps one to shape his judgment
upon higher principles. This latter, said
Thomas, imports a kind of perspicacity
in judgment.3"
In the judgments of judges, the common
rules are, of course, the written laws, the
positive or enacted law. These laws deter-
mine the rules of justice, either by reciting
what is just according to the law of nature,
or by authoritatively determining what is
just in matters that the natural law leaves
indeterminate. 34 Since the judge's task is
to decide what is just in a given case, he
cannot judge rightly without taking account
of the laws which express the common
rules of justice.35 These common rules, as
generalizations, must fail to provide for
s~ngular or unusual cases, as Aristotle
pointed out,3 but the judge's work is to
31 HOSTIENSIS, IN PRIMUM LIBRUM DECRETALIUM
COMMENTARIA, ad X. 1, 43, 9 (Venice, 1581).
32 ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, 6:11.
33 AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, II-II, q. 51, art.
4.
34 Id., 1-It, q. 60, art. 5, c.
3-5 Ibid.
36 ARISTOTLE, ETHICs, 6:11.
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decide what is just in cases each of which
is unique, or nearly so, in its component
and concomitant circumstances. 37 The com-
mon rules clearly fail to help the judge
decide cases justly when they are enacted
contrary to the requirements of natural
law. Since man's will cannot change nature,
such enactments are not to be followed
in the judge's decisions, for they are not
laws, but corruptions of the law.38 But even
laws rightly enacted fail sometimes because
they are so phrased that if the judge fol-
lowed them literally in some cases, his
decision would be contrary to natural law.
Here, says Thomas, the judge must decide
his case by resorting to the equity that the
legislator intended, as to a higher principle
of decision. Thomas relies upon the dictum
of Modestinus, "Neither the reason of the
law nor the benignity of equity will permit
us, by harsh interpretation, to make burden-
some what was put into the law to
benefit men."
39
It is important to note that, for St.
Thomas, judicial restraint was not dictated
by mere opportunism, but was imposed
by a reasoned philosophy. There is no
virtue whose acts the law may not require,
but the law's requirements must be limited
to those virtuous acts which serve directly
or indirectly the common welfare. 40 He
picks up Aristotle's distinction between the
legal duty and the moral duty. 4' The object
of the former is a performance or forbear-
ance that some law binds one man to render
to another. The latter is imposed by each
-37 AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I1-I, q. 60, art.
5, ad 2.
38 Id., l-I, q. 60, art. 5, ad 1.
39 DIGEST 1, 3, 25.
40 AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-It, q. 96, art.
3, c.
41 Id., It-lt, q. 80, art. 1, c, citing ARISTOTLE,
ETtIICs, 8:13.
man's necessity to be decent and virtuous.
Not every moral duty of a man is strictly
owed to another man. Some moral duties,
like those of honest dealing and fair recom-
pense, are imposed by the necessity of
maintaining decency in the community.
These are closely related to legal duties
and may easily pass over into that type
of obligation, because they are owed to
others, and because the community's need
for decency demands their performance.
On the contrary, such moral duties as
cordiality and liberality, though they con-
tribute to a greater common decency, are
not strict necessities of the human
community.4 2
St. Thomas' Summa Theologica became
a commonplace book for divinity students
in England from the middle of the
thirteenth century until the Protestant
Reformation. Indeed, it seems to have
influenced the thinking of such early
Protestants as Christopher St. Germain.
More English clergymen in that period felt
a commitment to the Franciscan and
Augustinian schools of theology than to
the Dominican school which St. Thomas
led. Yet St. Thomas' treatment of the
natural virtues, such as justice and equity,
was common doctrine in all three schools.
No fair appraisal of the work of the
English priests and bishops who developed
the distinctive doctrines of the Chancery
jurisdiction can fail to take account of the
concept of equity and its relation to law
which the medieval canonists developed
and St. Thomas formulated.
42 Ibid.
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